A quick scan of the leading figures in Western Philosophy reveals that relatively few have made a name for themselves by defending intuitive, natural, and sensible positions. Aristotle is
one, and perhaps Aquinas is another. Francisco Suarez, the sixteenth-century Spanish scholastic, would be a third. His invariable working procedure is to give copious consideration to the various ancient and medieval views, and then to find some This is a task that Freddoso has already taken up, not just with this translation but in a series of published articles. Yet even in this splendid translation Suarez often seems to be moving in a closed theoretical circle. One senses his philosophical skill, but often feels frustrated in trying to connect his concerns with our concerns. Even when the debate shifts to a more concrete level, and examples are offered, the gulf still remains.
The examples he considers (e.g., in discussing the possibility of action at a distance, how magnets work (209), and why the bottom of a kettle is cooler than the boiling water above it (203)) will be of interest to historians of science, but don't advance the philosophical debate as we now define it.
It is clear, in contrast, that DM 19 deserves a broad philosophic audience. Suarez's basic position is that "freedom exists formally in the will and not in the intellect" (337). This gets explained and defended in terms of a sophisticated action theory. Like all the appetitive faculties, an act of will is "an intrinsic and spontaneous tendency or inclination toward the object" (340). This means that desires and inclinations are not commanded or chosen by will, but simply are will's commands and choices. Only such inclinations count as intrinsically voluntary.
Other human actions, including intellection, are extrinsically voluntary, and therefore cannot be formally free.
In all of this Suarez attempts to follows Aquinian lines, but he seems at crucial points to make concessions to the voluntarism of earlier figures like Olivi and Scotus. Thus Suarez maintains that it is probable, though not certain, that will can choose either of two objects even when intellect has judged one of the two to be better (356). And he later holds that even at the instant at which a choice is made, the will must be both capable of choosing the act and capable of not choosing it. To explain how this can be true even at that instant at which the choice is made, he distinguishes between temporal instants and instants of nature 
